We consider a partially asymmetric three-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables. Two players (A and B) have the same payoff functions, and Player C does not. Two strategic variables are t i 's and s i 's for i = A, B, C. Mainly we will show the following results.
Introduction
t i is chosen from T i and s i is chosen from S i . T i and S i are convex and compact sets in linear topological spaces, respectively, for each i ∈ {A, B, C}. The relations of the strategic variables are represented by s i = f i (t A , t B , t C ), i = A, B, C, and t i = g i (s A , s B , s C ), i = A, B, C.
( f A , f B , f C ) and (g A , g B , g C ) are continuous, invertible, one-to-one and onto functions. When Players A and B choose t A and t B and Player C chooses s C , then t C is determined according to t C = g C ( f A (t A , t B , t C ), f B (t A , t B , t C ), s C ).
We denote this t C by t C (t A , t B , s C ).
When Players A and B choose s A and s B and Player C chooses t C , then t A and t B are determined according to t A = g A (s A , s B , f C (t A , t B , t C )) t B = g B (s A , s B , f C (t A , t B , t C )).
We denote these t A and t B by t A (s A , s B , t C ) and t B (s A , s B , t C ). When all players choose s A , s B and s C , t A , then t B and t C are determined according to
Denote these t A , t B and t C by t A (s A , s B , s C ), t B (s A , s B , s C ) and t C (s A , s B , s C ). The payoff function of Player i is u i , i = A, B, C. It is written as u i (t A , t B , t C ), i ∈ {A, B, C}.
We assume u i : T 1 × T 2 × T 3 ⇒ R for each i ∈ {A, B, C} is continuous on T 1 × T 2 × T 3 . Thus, it is continuous on S 1 × S 2 × S 3 through f i , i = A, B, C. It is quasi-concave on T i and S i for a strategy of each other player, and quasi-convex on T j , j i and S j , j i for each t i and s i .
We do not assume differentiability of the payoff functions. Symmetry of the game for Players A and B means that in the payoff function of each player, Players A and B are interchangeable. Since the game is a zero-sum game, the sum of the values of the payoff functions of the players is zero.
We assume that all T i 's are identical, and all S i 's are identical. Denote them by T and S. Sion's minimax theorem (Sion (1958) , Komiya (1988) , Kindler (2005) ) for a continuous function is stated as follows. We follow the description of Sion's theorem in Kindler (2005) . Applying this lemma to the situation of this paper, we have the following relations.
Further we show the following result.
Lemma 2.
) is the maximum of u A with respect to t A given t B and s C . Lett A (s C ) = arg max t A ∈T u A (t A , t B , t C (t A , t B , s C )), and fix the value of t C at
We have
where max t A ∈T u A (t A , t B , t 0 C ) is the maximum of u A with respect to t A given the value of t C at t 0 C . We assume thatt
is single-valued. By the maximum theorem and continuity of u A ,t A (s C ) is continuous, then any value of t 0 C can be realized by appropriately choosing s C given t B according to (1). Therefore,
On the other hand, max t A ∈T u A (t A , t B , t C ) is the maximum of u A with respect to t A given t B and t C . Lett A (t C ) = arg max t A ∈T u A (t A , t B , t C ), and fix the value of s C at
Thus, we have
) is the maximum of u A with respect to t A given the value of s C at s 0 C . We assume thatt A (t C ) = arg max t A ∈T u A (t A , t B , t C ) is single-valued. By the maximum theorem and continuity of u A ,t A (t C ) is continuous, then any value of s 0 C can be realized by appropriately choosing t C given t B according to (3). Therefore,
Combining (2) and (4), we get min
Since any value of s C can be realized by appropriately choosing t C given t A and t B , we have min
Thus, max
Therefore,
By similar procedures, we can show
given t A .
The main results
In this section we present the following main result of this paper.
Theorem 1. The equilibrium when all players choose t i 's is equivalent to the equilibrium when Player C chooses s C and Players A and B choose t i 's as their strategic variables.
Proof. 1. Consider a situation (t A , t B , t C ) = (t, t, t C ). By symmetry for Players A and B,
and arg max
given t C . Let t C (t) = arg max
We assume that it is a single-valued continuous function.
Consider the following function.
This function is continuous and T is compact. Thus, there exists a fixed point given t C . Denote it by t * (t C ), then
Now we consider the following function.
This also has a fixed point. Denote it by t * and t C (t * ) by t * C , then we have
and max
(t A , t B , t C ) = (t * , t * , t * C ) is a Nash equilibrium when all players choose t i 's 2. Because the game is zero-sum,
By symmetry u A (t * , t * , t C ) = u B (t * , t * , t C ). Thus,
This means 2u A (t * , t * , t C ) = −u C (t * , t * , t C ), and 2 min
From this and symmetry for Players A and B, we get arg min
We have min
From Lemma 2 we obtain min
= max
. Since any value of s C can be realized by appropriately choosing t C , min
Thus, arg min
(5) and (6) mean min
Therefore, arg min
Thus, by (7) min
Therefore, arg max
By symmetry for Players A and B, arg max
On the other hand, because any value of s C is realized by appropriately choosing t C , max
From (8), (9) and (10), (t * , t * , t C (t * , t * , s 0 C (t * ))) is a Nash equilibrium which is equivalent to (t * , t * , t * C ).
Interchanging t i and s i for each player, we can show 
Various examples
Consider a game of relative profit maximization under oligopoly including three firms with differentiated goods2. It is a three-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables. The firms are A, B and C. The strategic variables are the outputs and the prices of their goods. We consider the following six patterns of competition.
1. Pattern 1: All firms determine their outputs. It is a Cournot case.
The inverse demand functions are
where 0 < b < 1. p A , p B and p C are the prices of the goods of Firms A, B and C, and x A , x B and x C are the outputs of them.
2. Pattern 2: Firms A and B determine their outputs, and Firm C determines the price of its good.
From the inverse demand functions,
and
3. Pattern 3: Firms A and C determine their outputs, and Firm B determines the price of its good.
4. Pattern 4: Firms A and B determine the prices of their goods, and Firm C determines its output.
From the above inverse demand functions, we obtain
, and
5. Pattern 5: Firms A and C determine the prices of their goods, and Firm B determines its output.
6. Pattern 6: All firms determine the prices of their goods. It is a Bertrand case.
From the inverse demand functions, the direct demand functions are derived as follows;
The absolute profits of the firms are
c A , c B and c C are the constant marginal costs of Firms A, B and C. The relative profits of the firms are
The firms determine the values of their strategic variables to maximize the relative profits. We see
so the game is zero-sum. We assume c A = c B , that is, the game is symmetric for Firms A and B. However, c C is not equal to c A . Thus, the game is partially asymmetric. We calculate the equilibrium outputs of the firms in the above six patterns.
1. Pattern 1
3. Pattern 3
Pattern 4
x A = 2b 2 c C + bc C + 3b 2 c A − 2bc A − 4c A − 5ab 2 + ab + 4a (1 − b)(b + 2)(5b + 4)) ,
x B = 2b 2 c C + bc C + 3b 2 c A − 2bc A − 4c A − 5ab 2 + ab + 4a (1 − b)(b + 2)(5b + 4)) ,
x C = b 2 c C − 3bc C − 4c C + 4b 2 c A + 2bc A − 5ab 2 + ab + 4a (1 − b)(b + 2)(5b + 4)) .
Pattern 5
x A = 3b 2 c C − b 3 c C + 4bc C + 6b 3 c A + 16b 2 c A − 12bc A − 16c A − 5ab 3 − 19ab 2 + 8ab + 16a (1 − b)(b + 2)(b + 4)(5b + 4) , x B = 2b 2 c C + bc C + 3b 2 c A − 2bc A − 4c A − 5ab 2 + ab + 4a (1 − b)(b + 2)(5b + 4) ,
x C = 4b 3 c C + 7b 2 c C − 16bc C − 16c C + b 3 c A + 12b 2 c A + 8bc A − 5ab 3 − 19ab 2 + 8ab + 16a (1 − b)(b + 2)(b + 4)(5b + 4) .
Pattern 6
x A = 2b 2 c C + bc C + 3b 2 c A − 2bc A − 4c A − 5ab 2 + ab + 4a (1 − b)(b + 2)(5b + 4) , x B = 2b 2 c C + bc C + 3b 2 c A − 2bc A − 4c A − 5ab 2 + ab + 4a (1 − b)(b + 2)(5b + 4) , x C = b 2 c C − 3bc C − 4c C + 4b 2 c A + 2bc A − 5ab 2 + ab + 4a (1 − b)(b + 2)(5b + 4) .
We find that Pattern 1 is equivalent to Pattern 2 (an example of Theorem 1), but it is not equivalent to Pattern 3, and that Pattern 6 is equivalent to Pattern 4 (an example of Theorem 2), but it is not equivalent to Pattern 5. Pattern 1 (Cournot Pattern) and Pattern 6 (Bertrand) are not equivalent unless we have c C = c A .
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have examined equilibria in a partially asymmetric three-players zero-sum game under various situations. We want to extend the results of this paper to a general multi-players zero-sum game.
